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FOREWORD 
This Collaborative Paper is one of a series embodying the outcome of a 
workshop and conference on Economic S t r u c t u ~ a l  Change: Analy t ica l  I ssues ,  
held at IIASA in July and August of 1983. The conference and workshop formed 
part of the continuing IIASA program on Patterns of Economic Structural 
Change and Industrial Adjustment. 
Structural change was interpreted very broadly: the topics covered 
included the nature and causes of changes in different sectors of the world 
economy, the relationship between international markets and national 
economies, and issues of organization and incentives in large economic sys- 
tems. 
There is a general consensus that important economic structural changes 
are occurring in the world economy. There are, however, several alternative 
approaches to measuring these changes, to modeling the process, and to devis- 
ing appropriate responses in terms of policy measures and institutional 
redesign. Other interesting questions concern the role of the international 
economic system in transmitting such changes, and the merits of alternative 
modes of economic organization in responding to structural change. All of 
these issues were addressed by participants in the workshop and conference, 






The paper studies a two-region economy that has two sectors and three 
factors of production: oil, capital, and labor. The South exports oil in 
exchange for industrial goods from the North. There is a net capital inflow to 
the South. This equals the difference between its export revenues and import 
costs, and represents the South's indebtedness. This overseas borrowing 
finances the development of the oil sector: increased borrowing leads to &her 
oil supplies, to new levels of consumption and a new distribution of income in 
the South, and to new levels of industrial exports from the North. The paper 
studies the macro impacts of changes in the values of the debt on both the bor- 
rowing and the lending regions. 

RESOURCES, TRADE, AND DEBT* 
Graciela Chichlnisky**, Geoffrey Heal**, and D. McLeod*** 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A great deal of attention has been given recently to the debt problems of 
developing countries, most notably Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and Mexico. 
Their debts currently total about 300 billion US dollars, of whch Mexico's share 
is about one third. Ecuador and Mexico are particularly interesting cases 
because their current difficulties follow a period of concentration on oil 
exports, an activity which was widely recommended, and whch it was generally 
thought would improve rather than worsen their balance-of-payments condi- 
tions. 
Experience has not fulfilled these expectations. It is now clear that the 
relationship between resource export policies and debt is rather complex, and 
poses a challenge to the economist. In the case of Mexico, it is generally 
accepted that much of the borrowing was used to finance the development of 
its oil export sector. Sterner (1982) shows that about 30% of Mexico's out- 
standing debt was used to finance investment in PEMEX, the national oil com- 
pany. I t  appears therefore that there exists a link between borrowing and oil 
exports, and the macroeconomic impacts of borrowing and of resource exports 
must be jointly analyzed and balanced against each other. It is the purpose of 
this paper to explore these links. 
*This research was partially supported by The Rockefeller Foundation, NSF Grant SES 
7914050, The Institute for Economic Analysis, New York University, and the Internation- 
al Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria. 
**Columbia University, New York, USA. 
***New York University, New York, USA. 
A first concern is the impact of increasing oil exports on the exporting 
country. This was studied in Chichilnisky (19Bla) within a two-region, two-good, 
and three-factor general equilibrium model. It was shown there that increasing 
oil exports may have either a positive or a negative impact on the terms of 
trade, on domestic consumption, and on the distribution of income of the oil 
exporter, depending on the structure of the economy. The degree of dualism 
in production and the initial levels of wages and profits played a crucial role in 
determining the outcome. 
In this paper we extend Chichilnisky's model to study the impact of debt 
on the resource-exporting economy. The model is extended to allow for an 
imbalance in the trade account, which is matched by an inflow of overseas 
investment or a financial transfer. This imbalance represents the debt owed to 
foreigners, and is dlrected towards the expansion of oil supplies. Except for 
the wedge between export revenues and import costs, which represents the 
debt, the model is consistent with a standard competitive general equilibrium 
specification. Prices of all goods and factors in the two regions are free to 
adjust to market conditions. 
The introduction of the debt wedge changes the main relations in the 
model: the operation of Walras' Law or the national income identity in both 
countries is altered. Overseas investments lead to changes in oil supplies and 
consequently most variables adjust. As the debt increases, a new equilibrium 
emerges with different prices and levels of imports and exports. There are also 
changes in all domestic variables in both South and North: real wages, profits, 
domestic use of industrial and consumption goods, and employment of the fac- 
tors labor, capital, and oil. This allows us to trace the impact of the debt on 
the major macro variables of the two countries. The model could also be used 
to examine the impact of rescheduling, i.e, repaying the debt over a different 
time period, or of repaying it at  a different rate of interest. 
Following the macroeconomic impact analysis, two main questions 
emerge: the first is, who benefits and who loses from the accumulation of debt; 
and the second is, whether there exist debt-management policies that could 
make both countries better off, after taking fully into account the recycling 
effect of borrowing funds on imports from the lender. For example, at  present 
25-30% of all machine-tool exports of the US are purchased by Mexico, and a 
similar proportion of all US exports are purchased by Latin America. 
The interest of the results lies in part in their simplicity and in part in the 
fact that they account fully for the impact of the debt on all markets simul- 
taneously. Fairly simple analytical solutions are obtained to the rather com- 
plex questions posed. This is of course at the cost of somewhat stylized 
assumptions. 
We describe conditions under which increasing the debt leads the country 
to export more oil. In certain cases, t h s  leads to lower prices of oil, lower 
volumes of industrial imports, lower real wages, and higher profits in the oil- 
exporting country. In other cases, the results are reversed, and real wages, 
consumption, and terms of trade all improve in the exporting country. The 
outcome depends on the technologies of the South and on the initial prices. 
We also examine conditions under which the economy of the North actually 
benefits in macroeconomic terms from its loan to the South: because of lower 
oil prices, the consumption of both goods increases in the North when the 
transfer or loan increases. Tbs occurs mainly because the transfer leads to an 
improvement in the terms of trade in the North, and because its production 
system is integrated and efficient. This result is reminiscent of the argument 
that British investment overseas in the nineteenth century benefited the 
country by developing overseas supplies of food and raw material, thus making 
these supplies more elastic, keeping down prices, and improving the UK's 
terms of trade. Essentially we are specifying here conditions for overseas 
investment in material supplies to benefit the investing country even before 
any financial returns are paid, or in the case of a loan, before the loan is 
repaid. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. To provide some empirical 
background, we begin by reviewing the case of Mexico. We then present the 
North-South model with debt, after which we prove the main theorems. The 
conclusions summarize the results, and an appendix shows that,  although the 
model contains 33 independent equations, its comparative static properties 
can be understood by studying a single implicit functional relationshp between 
one endogenous variable (the terms of trade of oil for industrial goods) and one 
exogenous parameter (the value of the debt). 
2. EZdPIRICAL BACKGROUND: THE CASE OF MEXICO 
In this section we review briefly the empirical material relating to a 
number of the issues to be discussed below. The focus is on the case of Mexico, 
which is an important exemplar of the phenomena under examination. 
Cumulative bal~nn+f-payments deficit, current account 
FIGURE 1 The relationship between Mexico's cumulative balance-of-payments deficit 
and investment in PEMEX, 1966-1981. (All figures are in billions of 1970 US dollars.) 
In the Introduction we mentioned that the accumulation of Mexican debt is 
generally believed to have been associated with investment in PEMEX. Figure 1 
presents data on this association. Mexico's cumulative balance-of-payments 
deficit on current account is measured horizontally. The vertical axis 
represents cumulative investment in PEMEX. All figures are in billions of 1970 
US dollars, and data sources are given after the tables below. It is clear from 
Figure 1 that there is an almost one-to-one association between the cumulative 
payments deficit and investments in PEMEX: on average, the cumulative defi- 
cit slightly exceeds investment in PEMEX, but the two move very closely 
indeed. Ths  is confirmed by the regression in Table 1. It therefore seems jus- 
tifiable to claim that investment in PEMEX was financed by the payments defi- 
cit, and indeed this provides the empirical justification for an important 
assumption in the model that follows. 
Outstanding ovsnsar debt 
FIGURE 2 The relationship between Mexico's outstanding overseas debt and her cumu- 
lative payments deficit, 1965-1981. (All figures are in billions of 1970 US dollars.) 
What is the relationship between Mexico's cumulative current account pay- 
ments deficit, and her outstanding foreign debt? Figure 2 addresses this issue. 
Except for the period 1976-1979, these variables moved together, with the 
debt consistently some US$2-3 billion in excess of the cumulative deficit. (Fig- 
ures are again in billions of 1970 US dollars.) This interpretation of the graph is 
supported by the regression in Table 2, and is consistent with the fact that 
there was substantial private overseas borrowing by Mexican citizens whch was 
then used for the acquisition of overseas assets and which added to the accu- 
mulation of overseas debt. In the model which follows, this borrowing to 
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FIGURE 3 Mexican imports, exports, and terms of trade, 1960-1982. (Exports and irn- 
ports are  in billions of 1970 US dollars.) 
acquire overseas assets is neglected: it is assumed that indebtedness is equal 
to the cumulative balance-of-payments deficit, and is used entirely to finance 
investment in the oil sector. Obviously, this is a good approximation to the 
data for Mexico; furthermore, it seems likely that borrowing to finance the 
private acquisition of overseas assets had little macroeconomic impact within 
Mexico. The important macroeconomic changes were driven by investment in 
the oil sector, and by the consequent changes in oil output and oil exports. In 
any case, we shall argue below that when the overseas investment by Mexicans 
is taken into account, the results are likely to be reinforced. 
From Figure 1 it is clear that Mexico's cumulative deficit has risen over 
time. Figure 3 gives more insight into this: it shows the movements of 
imports, exports and the terms of trade (import prices relative to export 
prices) over the period 1960-1982. Exports rose steadily over the period. 
Imports moved roughly in parallel until 1973 when, with the exception of 1977, 
they moved ahead dramatically. As the terms of trade moved very similarly to 
imports in the last ten years, it seems that the rise in imports reflected an 
increase in prices rather than in volume of imports. The regression in Table 3 
documents t h s  point. So as Mexico borrowed and entered the world oil market 
as a seller, the terms of trade moved sharply against it, leading to a rapid 
deterioration in the balance of payments. The theory of the next section sug- 
gests that this was certainly not a coincidence, but was indeed to be expected. 
TABLE 1 OLS regression of investment in PEMEX, PMXI, on the cumulative current- 
acount deficit, CCA. 
PMXI = 0.598 + 0.844CCA 
(1.96) (19.36) 
t -statistics in parentheses. R' = 0.964. 
TABLE 2 OLS regression of cumulative current account deficit, CCA, on outstanding over- 
seas debt, D. 
CCA = -1.46 + 0.7530 
(-2.03) (10.76) 
t-statistics in parentheses. R2 = 0.885. 
TABLE 3 OLS regression of total imports, IMP, against the terms of trade, TT. 
IMP = -11.65 + 0.153 TT 
(- 10.78) (14.85) 
t statist ics in parentheses. R' = 0.916. 
Data Sources: 
All regressions cover the period 1965-198 1. 
PMXI Statistics on the Mexican Economy, NAFINSA, 1081. 
CCA World Tables, 198 1, World Bank. 
D 1965-1972 International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1982. 
1972-1981 Francisco Carrada-Bravo, "The Dynamics of Foreign Debt 
and Energy Policy: The Case of Mexico." Mimeo, Department of 
Economics, University of California a t  Los Angeles. 
IMP World Tables, 198 1, World Bank. 
TT World Tables, 1981, World Bank. 
3. THE NORTH-SOUTH MODEL WlTH DEBT 
In this section we present the model, which is an extension of that of Chi- 
chilnisky (1981a). There are two regions, the North and the South. Each pro- 
duces two goods, denoted B and I ,  with three factors of production, capital K ,  
labor L ,  and oil 29. The South exports an input, oil, in exchange for a good, the 
"industrial" good I .  The "basic" good B is not traded internationally. 
We first specify the model for one region, namely the South. In what fol- 
lows, the subscripts S and D will be used to denote supply and demand, and 
the superscripts N and S to denote variables or parameters referring to the 
North and South, respectively. All variables or parameters without a super- 
script refer to the South. The superscripts B and I after a factor (e.g. L B ,  K') 
denote the amount of that factor used in sector B or I ,  respectively. 
The basic good is produced according to the relation 
g B /  b , .  K B / c I ]  (1) 
and the industrial good according to 
Is = min [L'/ a 2 .  $ I /  b2 ,  K'/ c2] 
Labor and capital supplies are responsive to their rewards: 
Ls = a w / p B ,  a > O  
where w is the wage and p~ the price of B, and 
K s = p r ,  p > O  
where 7 is the rate of profit. p~ and p+ will stand for the prices of industrial 
goods and of oil, respectively. The demand for B derives from wage income 
pBBD = WL (5) 
The South produces oil (within given bounds), without using either domestic 
capital or labor. We shall assume that it uses the overseas borrowing or finan- 
cial transfer F T  to increase its oil supplies 
Z P S  = I ~ ~ ( F T ) ,  agS/t3FT > 0 (6) 
This completes the behavioral specification for the South. 
The equilibrium conditions for the South are: 
Bs = BD 
where B is not traded internationally, 
ID = Is + M? 
where MIS denotes the South's imports of I ,  
d$='8D +x$ 
where X$ denotes oil exports by the South, 
and the payments condition 
p+x$ = p I @ - ~ ~  
Note that FT could be either positive or negative, depending on the relative 
magnitudes of the debt service and the financial credit. However, as will be 
seen below, the effect of a transfer (FT positive) is not symmetric with that of 
a repayment (FT negative), because of the irreversibility of the investment in 
the oil sector. We assume that the entire financial transfer FT is used to pur- 
chase industrial goods to augment the supply of oil. This means that the new 
industrial investment in the oil sector is paid for by foreign loans. Hence, oil 
supplies .9s change as the debt level changes; the debt is assumed to increase 
with increases in the level of the transfer (FT positive), but obviously, it does 
not decrease when F T  is negative, since the debt is not paid by selling the oil 
production equipment. The balance-of-payments condition (15) is that imports 
of industrial goods exceed export revenues by F T .  As the demand for the basic 
good B comes entirely from wage income (eqn. 5), the national income identity 
((16) below) implies that the demand for industrial goods comes from the pro- 
fit income TK, oil revenues p + ~ $ ,  and the borrowing FT, with the last of these 
going to the oil sector. In the North we make a corresponding assumption, 
namely that the financial transfer to the South is taken from income that 
would otherwise have purchased industrial goods, so that the North's demand 
for industrial goods is TK - FT. 
In an equilibrium situation, Walras' Law or the national income identity of 
the South is always satisfied (see e.g. Chichilnisky 19Bla), i.e. 
where .9 = is, as in (6), a function of FT. Equation (16) can also be rewritten 
as 
pBBs + (Is + M I S )  = W L  + TK + P+( .~D + Xi)  + NF (16)' 
The model of the North consists of the same 15 equations, but with possi- 
bly different parameters a, 8 ,  al, a2, b ,, b z ,  c , ,  c2.  The following equation now 
substitutes for the original eqn. (6): 
'LPs = 0 (6)' 
and, of course, the equations corresponding to (8) and (9) reflect the fact that 
the North imports oil and exports industrial goods. In a world trade equili- 
brium the prices of the traded goods must be equal: 
S -  N P+ - Pu (17) 
PB = p r  (18) 
and traded quantities must also match: 
where XY and M! represent, respectively, the North's exports of I and imports 
of oil. There are therefore two sets of elght exogenous parameters each, one 
set for the North and the other for the South. Each set contains 
a, 8 ,  a l ,  a2,  b b 2 ,  c l ,  and c 2 .  These parameters are generally different in the 
two regions. We shall make certain stylized assumptions to simplify computa- 
tions: a is large in the South and relatively smaller in the North, indicating that 
labor is more "abundant" in the South. The corresponding parameter for capi- 
tal exhbits the opposite behavior: 8 is larger in the North than in the South. 
We shall also assume that c l  is small in the South, i.e. the production of basic 
goods uses little capital, and a 2  is small in the North, i.e. Northern industry 
uses little labor. There are a to ta l  of  33 independen t  equa t ions  f o r  the  com-  
p le te  Nor th-South  s y s t e m :  thirty correspond to two sets of (1) through (15), 
one set for each region, and three equations arise from the international trade 
conditions (17) through (20), since of these four, as usual, only three are 
linearly independent. There are 17 endogenously determined variables each in 
the North and in the South: p l , p , , p ~ ,  W ,  T ,  LS, LD, KS, KD, BS, BD, IS, 
ID, M I S ,  dS, dD, and x$. Finally, we have the transfer FT,  making a to ta l  of 35 
endogenous  v a r i a b l e s  f o r  the  co mple t e  North-South s y s t e m .  We therefore have 
33 equations in 35 unknowns. When we choose the numeraire (p+  = 1) an 
equilibrium is determined up to one variable. If we fix exogenously one vari- 
able, the equilibrium is (locally) unique. We choose this variable to be the value 
of the transfer FT. The transfer or loan thus becomes a policy variable. In the 
Appenhx we show how to compute explicitly a solution to the model, i.e, a 
value for each of the endogenous variables, for each policy sector FT. In par- 
ticular, we show that by successive substitutions the more important proper- 
ties of the model can be obtained from the study of a s ingle  equa t ion ,  giving an 
implicit relationship between the financial transfer FT and the price of indus- 
trial goods relative to oil. 
There are a number of determinants whose signs are important in the fol- 
lowing sections, which determine factor intensities in the different sectors. In 
total we have the following technical input-output coefficients: 
in each region. The determinants to be used are: 
The assumptions are : 
DN > 0, DS > 0, < 0, Q~ < 0 
The positivity of the determinant D implies that the basic goods sector is rela- 
tively more labor intensive and the industrial goods sector relatively more cap- 
ital intensive. The assumption (made above) that the basic goods sector uses 
very little capital in the South implies that c f  is small and therefore that 
M' < 0. The industrial goods sector in the North was assumed to  use little 
labor: hence a! is small and Q~ < 0. The above assumptions on the signs of 
the various determinants are maintained at all points below unless there is an 
explicit statement to the contrary. 
4. MAIN RESULTS: TRADE AND DEBT 
This section studies the impact of a change in the net  transfer FT on the 
economies of the North and the South. Before going on to  the algebra, it seems 
useful to explain the economics of this impact. 
An increase in the transfer FT increases oil supplies 29s, since the South 
invests borrowed funds in expanding the oil sector. At  the new equilibrium, 
corresponding to higher FT,  the total amount of oil utilized in the North and in 
the South therefore increases. Ths  in turn alters the supplies of both goods in 
each region, possibly in different proportions. The composition of the product 
changes in both regions. 
The changes in supplies lead to  new equilibrium prices for the two goods. 
The prices of the factors labor and capital also change as relatively more or 
less labor and capital are employed. Ths  implies that total income in the 
North and in the South are different a t  the new equilibrium. The results in this 
section give simple sufficient conditions for determining the signs of each of 
these effects. 
The first theorem gives conditions under which an increase in oil supplies 
decreases the price of oil with respect to that of the industrial good. While it is 
intuitively plausible that the price of oil should drop as supplies increase, this 
is not always true. The second theorem gives conditions under which the rela- 
tive price of oil increases as the transfer increases oil supplies. Whether one 
or the other result obtains, depends on the relative strength of supply and 
demand effects, and the general equilibrium solutions trace this in detail. The 
results are obtained from various assumptions on technologies and initial 
prices. 
The next step is to explore the general equilibrium impacts of an increase 
in the relative price of industrial goods. The rate of profit rises both in the 
North and in the South. In the North, the rate of profit and the real wage move 
together, because the North's economy is rather homogeneous. Therefore, 
both wage and profit income increase in the North, and we show that there is 
also an  increase in the consumption of both goods, even allowing for the loss of 
national income due to the transfer. All this occurs because the transfer has 
improved significantly the North's terms of trade. 
In the South, because of the rather different technologies in the two sec- 
tors, the real wage moves in the opposite direction to the rate of profit. The 
transfer increases oil supplies and oil exports, but oil revenues in terms of 
industrial goods imported are  reduced. Wage income and domestic consump- 
tion of basics decrease as well. If one sought to improve wage income without 
negatively affecting industrial consumption in the South, the economy of the 
South would have to  be made more homogeneous. 
The second theorem explores a different set of assumptions, and arrives at  
rather different conclusions. Now the transfer increases oil supplies, but it 
also increases the relative price of oil with respect to  industrial goods. As the 
terms of trade of the South improve, its macro variables react differently, and 
so do the variables in the North. The conditions under which one or the other 
result obtains are therefore quite relevant for policy, and should be deter- 
mined empirically. The simulations in the next section are a first move in this 
direction. 
A factor that plays an important role in determining the results of an 
increase in the transfer F T  is the sign of the expression 
where D is the determinant of the matrix 
The role and interpretation of this term have been discussed elsewhere (Chi- 
chilnisky 19Bla,b). Basically, the sign of this expression determines whether 
income effects will dominate price effects, so that increases in supplies will be 
proportionately larger or smaller than increases in demand as prices change. 
We refer to an economy as dual  if c 2 /  D < 2 w  / pB , since a large D would have 
this interpretation. Conversely, the economy is homogeneous  if 
c 2 /  D > 2 w  / p B .  It should be noted that this condition can be written so as to 
be independent of the particular units of measurement used. 
Theorem 1. Consider a Nor th-South  economy  a s  de f ined  above. A s s u m e  
t h e  economy  of t h e  Nor th  t o  be homogeneous  ( c 2 /  D > 2 w  / p B )  a n d  t h a t  of t he  
S o u t h  to  be d u a l  ( c 2 /  D < 2 w  / p B ) .  Suppose  t h a t  a t  t h e  in i t i a l  equ i l i b r ium the  
pr ice  of i n d u s t r i a l  goods a n d  t h e  r a t e  of p ro f i t  a re  re la t i ve l y  h i g h  in t h e  Nor th  
(pI  > b and 2 r  > a / D ) .  Labor is re la t i ve l y  a b u n d a n t  in t h e  S o u t h  ( a  large)  
a n d  capi ta l  r e la t i ve l y  a b u n d a n t  in t h e  Nor th  (p large) .  I n  this case a n  
increase  in t h e  t r a n s f e r  FT to  the  S o u t h  h a s  t h e  fol lowing consequences:  
( i )  Dil supp l i e s  a n d  oil ezpor ts  i ncrease  in t h e  S o u t h .  
(ii) The N o r t h  e zpor t s ,  a n d  t h e  S o u t h  i m p o r t s ,  f e w e r  i n d u s t r i a l  goods. 
However,  t h e  termr of t r a d e  m o v e  in f a v o r  of t h e  N w t h  (pl i ncreases )  
so  m u c h  t h a t  its e q o r t  r e v e n u e s  r i se .  There is a corresponding fa l l  
in oil e zpor t  r e v e n u e s  of t h e  S o u t h  denomina ted  in terms of its 
i m p w t  I .  
(iii) Fro f i t s  a n d  rea l  w a g e s  r i s e  in t h e  Nor th ,  so m u c h  t h a t  its c o m m p -  
t i o n  of bo th  goods increases .  
(iv) I n  t h e  S o u t h ,  p r o f i t s  r i se ,  b u t  e m p l o y m e n t ,  r ea l  w a g e s ,  a n d  c o n s u m p -  
tion of bas ics  a l l  f a l l ,  
Proof. We consider first the market-clearing condition in the oil market: 
X$ = hi$ ( 2 1 )  
From (6), (9), and (6) ' ,  this equals: 
+ ~ ( F T )  -1~j = $1 
From (14), '
d D  = b l B s  + b21s 
and from inverting (12) and (13 )  we obtain: 
In view of (3) and (4), we may rewrite (22): 
where Y and Q are the determinants defined above. Equation (25) gives an 
implicit relation between real wages and the rates of profits in both regions, 
and the transfer FT, which we denote as 
r [ T N .  r S ,  (W /pB)N, ( ~ 1 ~ ~ ) ~ ~  FT) = o (26) 
Since factor prices are functions of commodity prices (see Appendix eqn. A.7), 
we obtain from substitution of (A.7) into (25) a function linking the transfer FT 
to the prices of B and I: 
Equation (27) is an  implicit function of the form 
N S  r (FT,pI ,pB,pB)  = 0 
However, the prices of basics p i  and p! (which may be different since basics 
are not traded) are themselves functions of the price of industrial goods pz in 
equilibrium. 
From the Appendix eqn (A.13) we obtain: 
PI = P b I )  and PJ = PgSbI) 
Therefore, eqn. (27) is actually an  implicit function of pl and FT only 
~ ( F T . P ~ )  = ~ ( F T ,  PI. p l S (p~ ) .~ I (py ) )  = 0 (20) 
It is then possible to differentiate implicitly across equilibria and obtain 
8pIl BFT, or equivalently its reciprocal 
This equation represents the change in the price of industrial goods that fol- 
lows an increase in the transfer FT. By (27) and (6), 
ar - 
-- - > 0 
BFT aFT 
Therefore the sign of (29) is always that of -8r/ apI. 
We may now compute the derivative -aT/ apI From (27) and (28) we 
obtain: 
8 ~ 1  N N N  
- -(- aNddN ( ~ ~ - c f r p ~ ) -  a219 Q 
apr (D N)2 1 
From expression (30) we may compute the changes in pl as F T  changes, pro- 
vided we know the signs of the derivatives ap$/ apI and ap#/ apI across equili- 
bria. 
The next step is therefore to compute the signs of the derivatives of the 
price of basic goods with respect to the price of industrial goods across equili- 
bria in each region. For this we utilize the expression relating the real wage 
and the rate of profit in each region, derived from the market clearing condi- 
tion BS - BD = 0: 
(see Appendix eqn. (A.11)), and also the equations relating factor prices to 
commodity prices: 
(see Appendix eqn. (A.7)). Equation (31) is an implicit expression between real 
wages and profits in each region, denoted A(w /pB, T)  = 0. Since eqns. (31) and 
(32) give real wages and profits as functions of commodity prices, (31) actually 
gives an implicit relation between commodity prices in each region, denoted 
= O  I (34) 
From (34), by the implicit function theorem, in each region: 
Furthermore, from (32) and (33) we find that the partial derivatives 
and 
Therefore we obtain from (35) and (39) 
where 
From relation (40) we may now determine the sign of apB / 8pI in both the 
North and the South. First note that apB / apI is always positive in the North 
since pz > b 2 ,  so that pzc l  - M  > 0, and A > 0 by assumption. In the South 
A < 0, but @ is rather small. Therefore, (40) is also positive in the South. With 
this information we may now return to eqn. (27) and compute pg / apI. As a is 
large in the South and p is large in the North, we have from eqn. (30) that the 
expression for -pg / apI is dominated by the following terms: 
Here M - c  l p ~  = c l b  - b  ~c - c l p ~  is negative as c l  is small in the South. 
Hence the first term is positive (because M' < 0) and dominates the second, 
which is multiplied by c l .  As Q~ < 0, the third term is negative and the fourth 
positive. But a2 is small in the North, so that the fourth term dominates. 
Hence we have that 
This implies that the price of industrial goods pz rises as the transfer to the 
South increases, i.e. 
We next study the movements of the rate of return in the North r N  as p~ 
changes. From the national income identity 
lf = rK - FT 
As 11 = I#- X? and = X: = $1, 
In the North, /3 is large. We can therefore neglect terms other than those in /3, 
giving 
- [(-Q/ D )  + r ]  / ( a 1 /  D) PI - 
with 
Hence as F T  rises, pl rises and the profit rate in the North r N  rises. Knowing 
how r N  moves enables us to find the sign of the change in the real wage in the 
North. We can rewrite the market-clearing condition for the B market, eqn. (79, as 
ac2w /3azr 
D 
(see Appendix eqn. (A. 11)). Implicit differentiation gives: 
where A = a ( c 2 /  D - 2 w / p B ) .  As A < 0 in the North by assumption, we have 
that 
in the North. Hence an increase in FT raises the real wage in the North, as well 
as the profit rate. The next step is to show that the consumption levels of B 
and I  rise in the North. 
I [ = T K - F T  = ~ T ~ - F T  
which is positive for large /3. Also, 
BI= W L  / p ~  = a ( w  / p ~ ) ~  
so that BI also rises with FT by (45) ,  (42) ,  and (43) .  We have now proven point 
(iii) of Theorem 1 .  
Next we study the response of trade patterns to FT. We have, by inverting 
(12) and (13) ,  
From ( 3 )  and (4 )  
Hence 
By the conditions of the theorem, the first term is negative. By (45) the second 
term is negative, and by (44) it contains P. As p is large, these terms dominate, 
and 
i.e, the North's exports of the industrial good fall as FT and hence r N  rise. 
This implies, of course, that the South's imports of industrial goods fall, 
We next check what hap ens to the volume of oil traded. This equals oil I B .  demanded in the North, d D ,  whch from Appendix eqn. (A.3) is 
Here p is large and Q is negative, by assumption. r rises, by (43). Hence 
This proves points (i) and (ii) of Theorem 1. 
What remains is to study the behavior of the Southern economy. We first 
show that r S  rises with FT. This is done by showing that ah??/ arS < 0. As 
this will imply from (49) that ar / ars > 0, which in conjunction with (42) and 
(43) gives the desired result. 
M? = I$-I$ 
S 
= TK + d S  + FT-IS 
Now 
by (49), (42), (43), and (6). Similarly, B F T /  ~ M F  < 0. B y  (44), a(w / p B ) /  a7 < 0 
in the South. As by assumption as is large, t h s  establishes that 
81Uf 87 
< 0 so that - 
aFT > 0 ar 
It now follows from (44) and the fact that bS < 0 by assumption, that real wages 
in the South fall with F T .  It follows immediately from (3) and (5) that employ- 
ment and the consumption of basics also fall. 
This completes the proof of Theorem 1. 
Theorem 2. S u p p o s e  > 0, i . e .  c l b 2 -  b l c 2  > 0 in t h e  S o u t h .  Let p B  be 
s m a l l  a n d  pz  > b g  a t  t h e  i n i t i a l  e p d i b r i u m ,  with al l  o ther  condi t ions  a s  in 
Theorem 1 ,  T h e n  an i ncrease  in t h e  f inancial  t r a n s f e r  t o  the  S o u t h  has t h e  
opposite e f f e c t s  t o  those  established in Theorem I :  it l eads  t o  a fal l  in p z ,  t h e  
price of t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  good,  a n d  a re la t ive  increase  in t h e  price of oil ,  e v e n  
t h o u g h  oil supp l i e s  h a v e  increased .  The oil ezporter 's  t e r m s  of t r a d e  there fore  
i m p r o v e .  I n  add i t i on ,  oil expor t s  a n d  t h e  r a t e  of prof i t  in t h e  S o u t h  decrease.  
The North  expor t s  m o r e  i n d u s t r i a l  goods. Real  w a g e s ,  e m p l o y m e n t ,  a n d  con- 
sumption o f  basics i ncrease  in t h e  Sou th .  I n  t h e  North ,  t he  r a t e  of prof i t  a n d  
t h e  rea l  w a g e  decrease .  
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 1, the sign of BFT/  apI equals that of 
ar / apz .  This is given in eqn. (30), or approximately in (41). The latter may 
also be written as 
, . 
Now note from (40) that for large pN, 
Hence the second term above is zero and (41) can be expressed as 
Under the conditions of Theorem 2, this is negative, proving that the oil 
exporter's terms of trade improve, i.e. p z  falls with F T .  
The rest of the theorem follows immediately. Inequality (43) implies that 
the profit rate in the North falls, and (44) implies that real wages in the North 
fall. Inequality (48) tells us that the North's exports (and the South's imports) 
of industrial goods will increase, and from (50) we then know that oil exports of 
the South fall. (52) establishes that the rate of profit in the South falls, and 
using (44) again proves that real wages, employment, and consumption of basic 
goods rise in the South. This completes the proof. 
The main difference in the conditions of Theorems 1 and 2, which reverse 
the results, are first, the sign of and second, the impact that the transfer 
has on the relative price of industrial goods. The sign of JiS is positive in 
Theorem 2, and negative in Theorem 1. It seems more plausible that M S  
should be negative, since this happens when the basic goods sector in the 
South uses few capital inputs. Theorem 2 assumes, instead, that the basic 
goods sector is more capital intensive. The impact of the transfer on prices 
seems also more plausible in Theorem 1. There, the transfer increases oil sup- 
plies, and this leads to lower oil prices. In Theorem 2, the transfer also 
increases oil supplies, but this leads to higher oil prices. Clearly, an empirical 
analysis of the actual conditions is needed to evaluate the results, but, apriori, 
the conditions in Theorem 1 appear more intuitively natural than those in 
Theorem 2. 
A final point is the stability of the equilibria under the standard Walrasian 
adjustment process in which prices increase with excess demand, and decrease 
with excess supply. This is a rather specialized issue since the model has con- 
stant returns to scale. The Walrasian'stability of a closely related model (Chi- 
chilnisky 19Blb) has been studied in Heal and McLeod (1983) and the 
interested reader is referred to that paper for a detailed analysis. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
We have considered a situation where an inflow of capital investment into a 
country's oil sector has allowed that country to run a deficit on its balance of 
trade. The capital inflow is, of course, matched by an accumulation of indebt- 
edness to foreigners. An inflow of foreign capital, whether used for consurnp- 
tion or for investment, inevitably affects the internal equilibrium of the receiv- 
ing country. Consumption patterns, production patterns, and prices all 
change. The same is true of the lending country: it changes its consumption 
pattern by making a loan, and for this reason, and because the equilibrium of 
its trading partner changes, its own domestic equilibrium alters. A crucial fac- 
tor in determining these macro effects of a loan is the change in relative prices 
(oil prices, industrial prices, and prices of basic goods that are not traded). A 
loan must be of a significant size before having a measurable impact on prices, 
and the cases we discussed here, where the loan is of the order of 100 billion 
US dollars, certainly fit t h s  description. 
It is clear, then, that it is a complex matter to trace the full impacts of a 
loan from one trading country to another. Our model has enabled us to iden- 
tify these impacts in a rather simple fashion, because of our somewhat stylized 
assumptions, and to assess the gains and the losses arising from such a loan for 
different groups within the lending and borrowing countries. One important 
feature to emerge is that the loan may have a beneficial effect on the equili- 
brium of the lending country. This happens when the borrowed funds are used 
to increase oil supplies, leading to more abundant oil, increased oil exports, 
and lower oil prices. The terms of trade of the lending country improve, and 
this leads to hgher levels of consumption of both goods in the lending country. 
Theorem 1 establishes the conditions under which the welfare level in the lend- 
ing country will rise as a result. In making a social cost-benefit analysis of 
such a loan. this is a point that should clearly be considered; there is a social 
return to the loan over and above the rate of interest paid on it. It is possible 
that even if a major rescheduling that delayed repayment were to happen, the 
lending country as a whole could nevertheless benefit. Private financial institu- 
tions making the loan might of course be strained in such a situation. There 
could then be an argument in favor of the government compensating banks in 
the case of temporary losses, in view of the positive externalities that their 
actions have generated for the rest of the economy. Obviously, such a policy 
would require very careful analysis of the macro effects and of the interna- 
tional markets concerned. 
Similar issues apply to the receiving country. The borrowing sector may 
benefit in commercial terms from the loan, but a social cost-benefit analysis of 
the loan should also take into account its effects on the overall economic 
equilibrium. As Theorem 1 shows, these could be substantially negative, if 
there has been overspecialization in one sector thus leading to lower terms of 
trade for the country, with correspondingly negative welfare effects. In sum- 
mary, the fact that a loan, if large, may affect the equilibrium pattern of prices 
and quantities in both countries means that it will have macroeconomic conse- 
quences going far beyond its impacts on the profits of the borrowing and lend- 
ing institutions. 
Theorems 1 and 2 have indicated two very different possible outcomes. In 
one case, the effects are beneficial to the lending and harmful to the borrowing 
country, while in the other case 'the opposite is true. The distinguishng 
feature is the effect of the loan on the oil exporter's terms of trade. In the 
first case, they worsen, and in the second, they improve. Which of these two 
outcomes occurs depends on the patterns of factor intensities in the receiving 
country and the initial price levels. Once these are known, thus establishing 
whether the loan improves or worsens the receiver's terms of trade, everythng 
else can be traced. Experience indicates that over the last three years, the 
terms of trade of oil exporters have worsened. While many factors have contri- 
buted to this price movement, t h s  suggests that a policy of borrowing to invest 
in the oil sector might not have been the most favorable to the oil exporter. 
However, such a policy could be favorable to the lender; it yields more oil at 
lower prices. Such macro outcomes should be computed when discussing the 
present situation. The calculus of the debt must go beyond the financial 
aspects, and must include the macroeconomic effects on prices, imports, and 
exports of both countries. 
It is important to emphasize that we have studied the consequences of 
granting a loan before this was repaid. The repayments will not have effects 
that are simply equal and opposite to those of the granting of the loan. The 
asymmetry arises because, when the loan is made, it is invested or consumed 
in sectors different than those that will pay the debt. For instance, in this 
paper the debt was used to build up the production capacity of the oil sector. 
However, when the loan is repaid, this will not of course coincide with running 
down this capacity. Investment is irreversible, and capital stock and machnes 
depreciate. The loan will be repaid by running a balance-of-trade surplus. The 
effects of running a trade surplus a t  a constant capacity level in the oil sector 
are not the opposite of those running a trade deficit and using the capital 
inflow to expand oil-producing capacity. As a matter of fact, both could affect 
the major macro variables in the same direction. Ths distinction between 
receiving and repaying a loan will be developed further in a subsequent paper. 
Finally, we point out a connection between the problem that we have stu- 
died here and the extensive literature on the transfer problem in international 
economics. This literature is concerned with the possibility that a transfer of 
resources from one agent or country to another may benefit the donor and 
harm the recipient. This issue has so far been studied only in the context of a 
barter economy without production in the case of perfectly competitive gen- 
eral equilibrium models. For surveys of these results, see Chichilnisky (1980), 
Jones (1983), and Geanakoplos and Heal (1983). Our present Theorem 1 pro- 
vides an example of the transfer paradox in a production economy: resources 
are transferred from lender to borrower, and the lender gains as a result 
(Theorem I), even though the receiver expands its production capacity. 
This appendix gives an  explicit analytic solution to  the model, and 
presents the results of numerical simulations on the effects of rescheduling 
the debt reported in the paper. 
In order to  solve the model we consider first the equation equating oil 
exported with oil imported: 
X$ = M! (A. 1 )  
In view of ( 6 ) ,  (9), and (6) ' ,  this equals 
N 2Ps(FT) - 2PD = 2PD 
where the left-hand-side variables are from the South. From (14), (12) ,  and (13)  
where 
M = c l b 2 - b l c 2  Q =  a2bl-alb2 
Therefore, we may rewrite (A.2) as 
a w  BT N N N  
~ P ~ ( F T )  - F p g ~  - ,Q = --( aN -) w  N M N - B T  Q 
DN PB DN 
(A.4) is therefore an implicit equation in five variables, which we denote 
Our next step is to write the rate of profit T and the wage w  / p B  in the two 
regions as functions of the prices of basic and industrial goods, p~ and P I .  
Recall that oil is the numeraire (p+ = 1).  From the production functions ( 1 )  
and ( 2 )  we obtain the associated competitive price equations 
PB - 
[ P I  -21 = 1:: :;I [:I 
since p+ = 1. We therefore obtain the factor-commodity price relations: 
Substituting w / p B  and r from (A.7) into (A.5), we obtain a new implicit func- 
tion, in four rather than five variables: 
N S  ?(FT* p~ 1 PB) = O (A.0) 
Recall that may be different from p; because B is dot traded internation- 
ally. The last step is to substitute pi and p i  as functions of pI into (A.0). This 
will lead to an implicit function in two variables 
x(FT, PI) = 0 (A. Q) 
Since FT is an exogenously given parameter, (A.9) is an analytic solution to the 
model: from (A.9) we may compute the equilibrium level of industrial prices 
~;(FT). It is easy to check that once p; is known, we may solve for the equili- 
brium values of all other endogenous variables. This will be explained below. 
Now, in order to o b t a i n p ~  = pB we use another market-clearing con- 
dition, this time in the B-market: 
Bs = BD (A. 10) 
From (12) and (13) this can be written as 




PB -"I' Da 
(A. 11) 
(A. 12) 
a two-branched function relating w /pB and T .  The different parameter values 
will determine which is the appropriate branch in (A.12). 
Using again the factor-commodity price relations, (A. 12) yields an implicit 
relation between pg and PI, as desired: 
(A. 13) 
Substituting (A.13) into (A.B), we obtain the desired relation (A.9) between FT 
and P I  
From (A.9)  we may then compute p; = ~ ; ( F T ) .  From (A.13) we obtain  pi(^) 
and  pi(^), and from these three equilibrium prices we obtain the equihbrium 
rates of profit r * ( N )  and r * ( S ) ,  and of real wages, (zu / p B )  * ( N )  and 
(w / p B ) * ( S ) .  From these we obtain supply of labor and capital in the North 
and the South, and using the inversion of (12)  and (13)  we obtain the output of 
B and I in both regions. From the national income identity we may compute 
demand for I in the South, which determines imports from the North, and from 
(40) ,  exports of oil from the South. From (14)  we obtain oil demanded in the 
South, thus completing the computation of the equilibrium. 
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